The Role of a 3rd Party in CFSI OECD/NEA Workshop

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Introduction

The subject of counterfeit, fraudulent and suspect items (CFSI) is a significant topic in the nuclear industry in light of some high profile incidents in the past few years. Civil nuclear plant owners and operators mostly focus on detection to fight this; enhanced levels of inspection, supply chain audits, and repeat inspections are among the weapons employed.

This short presentation will look at the benefits of prevention of CFSI and the role Nuclear Safety Culture plays

Conformity Assessment

- Conformity In accordance with standards or documented requirements
- Assessment Checking

• Is that it then? The 3rd party checks the item or equipment meets the documented requirements?.

What went wrong then?

- A recent review at a long-time manufacturer of high integrity forgings found, among other items:
- The ISO 9001 and ASME management systems may detract from a comprehensive management system, through focussing on compliance issues rather than a system for the management of regulatory and other aspects related to the production application
- There is a risk that the cumulative effect of a series of "minor" changes are considered acceptable without requalification, since revisions to qualification documents were not reviewed against original specifications and qualifications
- The metallurgical aspects of the process are well understood, but it is not clear if they are
 documented in a way that can be applied by those operating the processes and carrying
 out tests.

An effective CFSI policy doesn't just cover detection procedures. It should cover culture, prevention, detection and lessons learned.

- Most suspect items have a Management System approved manufacturer or supply chain
- Review of documented information does not detect culture
- Prevention is better than detection detection confirms prevention
- Sharing across industries is imperative as supply chains lengthen and merge.

Cost of effective CFSI Culture too high?

- "Researchers at Energy Technologies Institute found that most high-cost projects had started construction with incomplete designs, whereas work on low-cost plants had begun only once design and planning had been finalised."
- Taking the point that a complete design and clear plan help to produce a cost effective project, then a clearly defined culture which forms an integral part of the project implementation will recognise incomplete, unformed and suspect issues and deal with them.

Nuclear Safety Culture Elements

IAEA record 9 key elements for

NSC

Leadership Safety Values and Actions	Problem Identification and Resolution	Personal Accountability
Work Processes	Continuous Learning	Environment for Raising Concerns
Effective Safety Communications	Respectful Work Environment	Questioning Attitude
		PREVENTIO N

Lloyd's Register

DETECTIO

Summary

- Nuclear Safety Culture leads on both detection and prevention
- Certification provides a basis for certainty of implemented processes
- The cost of bad CFSI systems is potentially very high
- Intelligent selection of conformity assessment is imperative
- Target why things change and what was originally planned.

Thoughts and Insights



https://www.lr.org/en/insights/articles/nuclear-supply-chain-fraud-the-elephant-in-the-room/

Thank you

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